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INSTITUTIONALIZING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ALTERNATNES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, conflict management alternatives such as joint problem-solving, 
negotiation and mediation have been utilized in a variety of contexts. For example, 
representatives from environmental organizations, government, and industry have been involved 
in negotiations and mediations; some business organizations have pledged to rely upon joint 
problem-solving and negotiations before going to court in various situations; negotiation and 
mediation are becoming more commonplace in domestic disputes; and medical professionals, 
patients and family members have been involved in joint problem-solving regarding appropriate 
medical care. Proponents of these conflict management alternatives share a frustration with 
traditional adversarial, often judicially-based methods of dispute resolution. 
As evidence continues to mount supporting the desirability and efficacy of conflict 
management alternatives, attention has been drawn to institutionalizing these conflict 
management innovations. The framework presented in this paper is not definitive; rather, the 
purpose is to raise key issues and test the utility of diverse literatures. The many environmental 
examples reflect the author's background in environmental dispute resolution. However, the 
multidisciplinary literature review permits the presentation of a more general framework, and is 
applicable in a variety of contexts. 
In this paper, the term " conflict management alternatives" ("CMA") is used rather than 
the more familiar phrase "alternative dispute resolution" ("ADR"). ADR usually refers to 
alternative ways to use the court system, that is, "bargaining in the shadow of the law." "Conflict 
management alternatives" suggests a broader interpretation of these innovations. It includes all 
potential public and private, judicial and non-judicial dispute resolution efforts by individuals, 
organizations and communities. I t  also incorporates the need for long term, institutional change. 
The discussion is not meant to suggest that the goal of institutionalizing CMAs is to eliminate or 
even minimize conflict. It is assumed that conflict will continue to be a normal part of human 
interactions. However, institutionalization is important to prevent "one shot" or scattered 
experiments with CMAs that could lead to frustration, inefficiency, or inequities. 
11. WHAT IS INSTITUTIONALIZATION? 
Institutionalization involves the trial, regularization and formalization of CMAs. By trial, -
we mean initial experimentation with new techniques for managing conflict in relationships, 
organizations and communities. Regularization refers to the way these trial CMAs become 
accepted into regular use. Formalization includes the ways CMAs are codified and described by 
some form of policy statement, statute, or explicit agreement between parties. 
As the above definition suggests, institutionalization is a process that varies in formality 
and scope. As Edelman (1984) has suggested, institutionalization is not an "all or nothing 
concept"; there are degrees of institutionalization. 
"It may be a voluntary program that would operate a t  an entirely different order of 
magnitude if it were made compulsory. It may have the potential for being applied 
systematically in a larger unit of government; if it is now operating a t  the county level, it 
could perhaps be adopted on a statewide basis ..." (p. 135). 
In other words, assessments of the appropriate meaning of institutionalization depend upon one's 
goals and perspectives. As Edelman suggests, "What is institutionalized from one perspective 
may still be unproven from another" (p. 135). 
I t  is important to recognize that institutionalization of new techniques implies the 
displacement of existing social practices. Therefore, institutionalization is dominated by the 
phenomenon of change. Several different models of social change are examined in Section V to 
provide a fuller understanding of institutionalization as  a change .process. 
rn. WHAT IS BEING INSTITUTIONALIZED? 
Institutionalization of CMAs involves the trial, regularization and formalization of (1) new 
individual attitudes and skills, (2) new forms of existing relationships or entirely new 
relationships, and (3) organizational mechanisms for implementing and enforcing new conflict 
management methods and agreements. In other words, institutionalization occurs a t  the 
individual, intergroup and organizational levels. These three levels differ in terms of their 
complexity and degree of required change. 
Individual Attitudes and Skills 
Alternative conflict management methods usually involve non-adversarial, interest-based 
bargaining techniques (Fisher and Ury, 1981). These methods involve interactive dialogue and a t  
least minimal cooperation among disputants, often with the assistance of an external third party. 
For many disputants, the switch from adversarial to more collaborative, interest-based negotiation 
techniques may require changing attitudes toward conflict and gaining new skills. 
As an example of new attitudes, people may need to overcome negative feelings about 
conflict. People often are afraid of conflict; they may view it as a disruptive force that should be 
avoided or ignored. However, proponents of CMAs suggest that conflict episodes can be viewed as 
opportunities for improving communication (Amy, 1983; Bingham, 1986), enhancing group 
solidarity (Coser, 1956), creative problem-solving (Thomas, 1976) and personal growth (Katz, 
1964; Moore, 1986). 
Similarly, institutionalization implies that coercive or adversarial attitudes and approaches 
to conflict management need u, be replaced by more collaborative ones. For example, many 
people are accustomed to viewing conflict in win/lose terms, that is, someone wins, someone loses. 
However, CMAs usuaily are based on a commitment to winlwin outcomes. This committment 
means that the basic interests of all parties in the dispute must be explicitly recognized and 
protected. Disputants need to learn how to identify and communicate their underlying interests, 
and validate the interests of others involved in the dispute. 
Institutionalization also can change attitudes toward and reliance upon external 
authorities. People often are accustomed to relying on external authorities to resolve their 
conflicts. However, institutionalization can lead to a greater degree of individual participation and 
control for disputants. In fact, conflict management methods can be arrayed along a continuum 
that represents increasing degrees of control by disputants (Laue and Corrnick, 1974; Marks, et. 
al., 1984; NIDR, 1984). Traditional processes such a s  adjudication and arbitration lie a t  one end 
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of the continuum, where procedures and outcomes are controlled by external authorities. 
However, many CMAs such as  negotiations and joint problem-solving lie a t  the other end of the 
continuum, where procedures and outcomes are controlled primarily by disputants. Mediation 
may lie somewhere in the middle. Thus, disputants may lessen their reliance upon external 
authorities, and may need to learn new communication and negotiation skills as they take greater 
control over the management of their own conflicts. 
hlationships 
Disputants may possess the requisite attitudes and negotiation skills without necessarily 
acknowledging the existence or legitimacy of an ongoing problem-solving relationship. Similarly, 
existing social structures may not be designed to facilitate or support cooperative, problem-solving 
relationships. For example, traditional hierarchical decision-making structures in organizations 
often create incentives for adversarial behavior. There may be no overarching goals that 
transcend and connect highly specialized roles and promote cooperation. 
Institutionalization involves the creation and acceptance of ongoing problem-solving 
relationships and the requisite social structures to support them. For example, Bacharach and 
Lawler (1980) discuss the importance of getting parties to recognize each other as  legitimate 
participants, so that cooperative problem-solving relationships can be established and formalized 
within organizations. They state that conflict resolution is easiest when the problem-solving 
relationship can be made explicit and formalized. 
The importance of institutionalizing a relationship is further supported by Brown's work on 
interface analysis (1983). Brown defines an interface a s  "...the meeting grounds where social 
units come face to face and parties interact. These social units may be groups, departments, or 
whole organizations ..." (p. 1). Implicit in Brown's definition of an interface is an emphasis on the 
relationships between parties. Like other relationships, interfaces vary in terms of their degree of 
development and organization; the level of organization of the interface will affect how conflict is 
managed. 
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Beres and Schmidt's (1982) discussion of social contexts coincides with Brown's discussion 
of the level of development of relationship between disputants in interface dynamics (1983). 
However, they also argue that contexts and relationships are governed by dominant norms which 
guide behavior: "...different types of social contexts encourage and legitimize different types of 
behavior" (p. 44). Thus, the norms that govern relationships may have to be altered in order to 
facilitate the institutionalization of CMAs. Traditionally adversarial relationships must develop 
patterns and norms that legitimize collaborative exchanges. 
Organizational Mechanisms 
Although disputants may possess negotiation skills and acknowledge each other as 
legitimate parties in a problem-solving relationship, without the means to ensure that agreements 
are supported, implemented and enforced, conflict management efforts may be short-lived or 
futile. Means of implementing agreements are clearly linked to the perceived legitimacy of the 
problem-solving relationship: if the relationship is not perceived as  legitimate, agreements 
resulting from such a relationship will not be deemed legitimate and will not be implemented. 
Perceptions of legitimacy may depend on actions of top-level leaders who announce new priorities 
and create organizational structures- that support problem-solving relationships. 
One example of an organizational mechanism created to facilitate the implementation of a 
consensus agreement involves a dispute in southwestern Colorado. In 1983, a dispute over 
proposed road building and logging in the San Juan National Forest was successfully mediated. 
However, in order to ensure that the consensus agreement was implemented properly, a citizen 
advisory group was legitimized by the United States Forest Service to oversee the implementation 
of the agreement (Tableman, 1985). 
Conflict management alternatives must be perceived as  legitimate and acceptable not only 
by involved disputants, but also by parties in the wider social structure which may be impacted by 
or involved in the implementation of agreements. The importance of acceptance of innovations by 
the wider social structure is supported by Rogers' (1962) work on diffusion. Similarly Katz (1961) 
asserts: 
"...it is about as  unthinkable to study diffusion without some knowledge of the social 
structures in which potential adopters are located as  it is to study blood circulation without 
adequate knowledge of the structure of veins and arteries." 
In this section we have argued that negotiation skills, the problem-solving relationship, and 
organizational mechanisms that support the implementation and enforcement of agreements 
comprise three key components of institutionalization. As suggested above, it is possible for 
parties to possess negotiation skills without having a legitimate problem-solving relationship. 
Conversely, parties may have a relationship conducive to joint problem-solving without having the 
corresponding social structure to support conflict management procedures and outcomes. Thus, 
the most successful forms of institutionalization involve innovations a t  the individual, intergroup 
and organizational levels that support conflict management alternatives. 
IV. PROPOSED APPROACHES TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Most scholars and practitioners agree that institutionalization can and should take a 
variety of forms, depending on the situation. Several general approaches have been proposed, and 
in some cases implemented. One approach involves the gradual accretion of ad hoc practices. For 
example, in relatively private situations such as marital disputes, spouses can agree to try new 
negotiation skills; the new skills gradually may become standard practice in the marriage over 
time through their adoption and regular use. In sharp contrast, another model involves sudden 
change adopted in the midst of a crisis, or mandated by laws or organizational policies. However, 
institutionalization in the form of sudden change generally requires tremendous threat or coercive 
power for enforcement, and could engender temporary compliance without deep or long-term 
commitment. 
Both mandatory and voluntary approaches have been proposed. The voluntary approach 
involves increasing the available supply of information, resources, and practitioners trained in 
conflict management alternatives without mandating the use of such services (Edelman, 1984). 
Examples of the voluntary approach include neighborhood justice centers (Marks, et. al., 1984) 
and state offices of mediation (Meeks, 1985) which help make alternative methods of conflict 
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management more available to interested parties. The mandatory approach involves increasing 
the demand for CMAs through formal policy or legislation, such a s  legislation that mandates the 
use of negotiation and mediation for siting of solid and hazardous waste facilities (Meeks, 1985). 
Both generic or issue-specific approaches to institutionalization are possible. For example, 
most state offices of mediation and most neighborhood justice centers may offer generic conflict 
management processes for a variety of substantive issues (Meeks, 1985). In contrast, legislative 
programs often institutionalize CMAs for specific types of disputes such as the siting disputes 
mentioned above. Similarly, some conflict management centers are developing issue specific 
programs; for example, the Conflict Clinic in St. Louis and the Minnesota Office of Dispute 
Resolution have developed special programs for the mediation of farmer-lender disputes. 
Finally, internal or external approaches to institutionalization are possible. For example, 
in private disputes, institutionalization can occur inside or outside of the relationship. When 
marital partners learn new conflict management skills which are institutionalized in their 
relationship over time, this form of institutionalization occurs inside the relationship. However, 
when marital partners regularly and formally seek assistance from counselors or mediators who 
serve as third parties, they adopt a form of institutionalization that occurs external to their 
relationship. Community and neighborhood disputes may follow similar patterns: disputants may 
learn conflict management skills which enable them to resolve their own problems by 
institutionalizing the skills in their regular interactions; or disputants may rely upon assistance 
from neighborhood justice centers and community mediation programs which represent externally 
institutionalized forms of CMAs. 
Institutionalization also may occur inside or outside of organizations. For example, in the 
health care field, hospitals may create "in-house" ethics committees or patient support groups as 
mechanisms for regulating conflicts between health care providers and consumers (Chesler and 
Chesney, 1986). Similarly, business organizations may create an internal division whose sole 
responsibility is to manage intraorganizational conflicts. However, in the health care field, patient 
advocacy self-help groups may be organized outside of the medical establishment and link to 
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medical institutions to regulate conflicts between health care consumers and providers (Chesler 
and Chesney, 1986). Likewise, business organizations may contract with external mediators or 
conflict management organizations for assistance in resolving intraorganizational disputes. 
V. HOW DOES INSTITUTIONALIZATION OCCUR? 
We have argued that the trial, regularization and formalization of conflict management 
alternatives involves change -- change in individual skills and attutudes, in social and task 
relationships, and in organizational structures. However, how these changes occur depends upon 
what model of change is employed. 
Chin and Benne (1976) propose three models of planned change: (1) the Rational- 
Empirical, (2) the Normative-Reeducative, and (3) the Power-Coercive. Rational-Empirical 
institutionalization proceeds through basic research and knowledge put into action by trained 
professionals. The Normative-Reeducative model stresses the need for change in habits and 
values a t  the personal level, and change in normative structures and in institutional roles and 
relationships a t  the organizational or sociocultural level. Accordingly, institutionalization proceeds 
primarily through the clarification and reconstruction of values and norms. The Power-Coercive 
model recognizes that power is required for change, and suggests that change must involve the 
action of ruling elites or their recomposition and manipulation. Of course, knowledge is one form 
of power, 'but institutionalization would occur essentially through Normative-Reeducative 
strategies backed by Political Coercion. 
Crowfoot and Chesler (1982) propose another framework for changes relevant to conflict 
management within organizations, also with three models: (1) Organizational Development, (2) 
Unionization and Collective Bargaining, and (3) Worker's Control and Democratic Management. 
-4ccording to the Organizational Development model, institutionalization would occur through 
management's efforts to improve communications and normative commitments to CMAs: 
bureaucratic structures and processes and organizational goals would remain the same. According 
. to the Unionization and Collective Bargaining model, institutionalization would take place through 
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existing unions and bargaining channels. Both labor and management are seen to benefit as  
CMAs provide improved problem-solving tools to further their collective interests. However, the 
power of organized unions is necessary to coerce management to accept and legitimize the 
bargaining relationship. The Worker's Control and Democratic Management model moves beyond 
the power contest between workers and management, and workers and unions; power is controlled 
by workers, and organizational values are determined by workers' needs. Accordingly, 
institutionalization of CMAs would be controlled by workers to benefit their needs. 
Sashkin, Morris and 'Horst (1973) present a third framework that describes five change 
models: (1) Research, Development and Diffusion, (2) Social Interaction and Diffusion, (3) 
Intervention Theory and Method, (4) Planned Change, and (5) Action &search. Like the models 
described above, each model has different implications concerning how institutionalization of CMAs 
could occur. 
Implicit in all the models presented above is the question, "Whose interests are served by 
institutionalization?" Top down models such as  Rational-Empirical and Power-Coercive (Chin and 
Benne, 1976) and Organizational Development (Crowfoot and Chesler, 1982) rely upon change 
being articulated by existing managers. As such, changes are likely to safeguard the needs and 
interests of these current power holders. In contrast, bottom up models such as Workers' Control 
and Demgcratic Management (Crowfoot and Chesler, 1982) and potentially Power-Coercive (Chin 
and Benne, 1976) when change is initiated by lower power parties, are more likely to serve the 
needs of the lower power parties. Thus, whether institutionalization of CMAs proceeds from the 
top down or from the bottom up has serious implications for the types of interests served. 
These general models of organizational innovation suggest that institutionalization of 
CMAs may involve shifts in patterns of power and authority, new organizational roles and 
working relationships, and potentially altered organizational structures, cultures and missions. 
Shifts in Power and Authority 
Evidence suggests that conflict management alternatives and resulting outcomes are most 
effective and just when extreme power inequities have been somewhat equalized (Cormick and 
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Patton, 1980; McCarthy, 1984; Moore, 1986). If one party is clearly more powerful and likely to 
"win", there is little incentive for negotiation and compromise (Bellman, 1983; McCarthy, 1984). 
Low power parties face the dual disadvantage of not having the power to force others to a 
bargaining table, and, should CMAs be employed, being in danger. of being coopted by more 
powerful participants (Amy, 1983a; Crowfoot, 1985). Thus, concerns for both practicality and 
social justice suggest that extreme power imbalances must be changed, and new patterns of 
authority must be established before CMAs can be successfully utilized (Laue and Cormick, 1974). 
Altering imbalances in power may involve recognizing and legitimizing influencial parties 
who may not possess formal authority (~acharach and Lawler, 1980). Authority usually is 
derived from the formal state or organizational hierarchy and is limited in its distribution and 
forms. In contrast, influence is derived from the informal social or organizational structure and is 
likely to be more widely distributed. Bacharach and Lawler's work suggests that CMAs often 
create new patterns of authority by balancing formal, hierarchical authority and informal forms of 
influence. For example, in business organizations, managers occasionally may have to set aside 
their formal hierarchical authority and work with influential workers in collaborative problem- 
solving teams. Managers' overt recognition of workers' concerns and involvement helps to 
empower workers, and can lead to greater power parity and new forms of authority in 
organizations. 
Creating new7 patterns of authority may not be sufficient to effectively balance power if 
information and expertise also are not redistributed. For example, in many environmental 
disputes, access to scientific expertise is a significant source of power. Consequently, sometimes 
the parties have agreed to share existing environmental data, or to create their own data base 
through joint fact-finding. Similarly, Rieff (1974) discusses the need to break the monopoly of 
knowledge in the medical field in order to empower and inform patients. Thus, institutionalization 
of CMAs also may involve the redistribution and sharing of information and expertise as a form of 
power balancing. 
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The literature on CMAs ir, virtually every area of application emphasizes that the 
presence and role of an external third party often can be critical in helping to balance power(Amy, 
1983; Cormick, 1980; Moore, 1986). By setting ground rules and serving a s  a referee of the 
process, the third party can redistribute expertise, promote productive dialogue and minimize 
destructive power plays. Although third party intervenors have different views of their 
appropriate role, many consider advocacy for lower power disputants and for power parity as a 
legitimate component of their role (Laue and Cormick, 1974; Lee, 1982). The continuing presence 
of an external third party can be a key component in the creation of lasting new patterns of 
authority as well. 
New Roles and Working Relationships 
Institutionalization of CMAs may neessitate temporary or permanent changes in 
organizational structure. Traditional bureaucratic structures specialize function, and solidify and 
isolate separate work groups. The formal organizational structure has well developed vertical 
linkages and communication flows, but usually limited lateral linkages and communication 
between working groups and departments. Thus, problem-solving across departments and groups 
may be difficult (Galbraith, 1979). Since CMAs typically involve face-to-face interactions, work 
groups or departments that have no pre-established procedures, rules, and norms to govern 
interactions could find themselves involved in face-to-face problem-solving situations. As Brown 
explains, "...since interfaces are between social units, authority, responsibility, and appropriate 
behavior are often unclear" (p. 16). Thus, institutionalization of CMAs means that new lateral 
relationships and linkages, and the corresponding communication channels and patterns of 
responsiblility may have to be created (Brown, 1983; Galbraith, 1979). 
In many cases, linkages within and between organizations will not be permanent 
components of the organizational structure. Formal organizational structures may remain intact 
with working groups or task forces emerging as tne need arises (Galbraith, 1979). However, in 
some cases, the institutionalization of CMAs will necessitate permanent changes in the formal 
organizational structure. Katz and Kahn (1987) highlight the importance of systemic changes in 
organization structure as a means of promoting change in individual behavior and working 
relationships. They emphasize that, 
"The major error in dealing with problems of organizational change, both a t  the practical 
and theoretical level, is to disregard the systemic properties of the organization and to 
confuse individual change with modifications in organizational variables." 
Bidol's work with the South Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD") illustrates 
how a resource agency has had to make permanent structural changes in order to institutionalj.ze 
CMAs. In trying to respond more constructively to the increasing number of environmental 
conflicts with which they are confronted, the SFWMD seeks to ' I . . .  institutionalize environmental 
conflict management competencies into the agency's ongoing decision-making and operational 
procedures" (Bidol, 1984). The objectives of their reorganization include: 
1. Develop an organizational design for the district as  a whole and for each department 
which ensures that there are positive linkages between the district's strategy, work tasks, 
and its formal and informal structures so that i t  can proactively problem-solve its internal 
and external challenges and conflicts; and 
2. Develop structures and procedures to support cross-departmental problem-solving, and 
to facilitate positive interactions between the district and external stakeholders (Bidol, 
1984). 
In order to meet these objectives, the SFWMD had to make permanent structural changes 
in their organization. For example, several new departments were created to improve internal, 
lateral relations a s  well as linkages with external constituents: the Department of Resource Policy 
was established to support cross-departmental problem-solving, and the Department of Resource 
Coordination was created to engage the public and private sectors with line managers in conflict 
management processes (Bidol, 1984). 
As Bidol's work also illustrates, changes in organizational structure may include an 
expansion of boundary spanning capabilities, so that functional links can be established with other 
organizations. Brown (1983) refers to such relationships a s  "organization interfaces", i.e., the 
interfaces between organizations. Similarly, Katz and Kahn (1978), Adams (1976), Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967), and numerous other organizational theorists have written about the importance of 
boundary spanning and interactions with the organizational environment. For example, many 
government resource agencies like the SFWMD have had to designate personnel to communicate 
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with external interest groups so that resource managers could more effectively manage conflicts 
and design policies that meet the needs of their various constituents. 
Greater boundary spanning also can lead to changes and ambiguities in roles, authority 
and responsibility. Organizational members may have to obtain and process new information and 
develop new areas of expertise. Similarly, organizational members may have to develop a greater 
appreciation of diversity as  they move beyond their own organizaton's perspectives and needs. 
Increased boundary spanning also may create new representational responsibilities for 
organizational leaders. For example, when environmental disputes are resolved through the use 
of CMAs, representatives from government agencies, industry and citizen groups may have to 
work together as  a problem-solving team while also representing their own constituents. 
Similarly, medical organizations that link with externally-based consumer groups have to create 
new working relationships. Medical personnel, patients and family members have to learn to 
manage the attendant ambiguities as  they adopt new roles in the pursuit of collaborative patient 
care (Chesler and Chesney, 1986). 
Changes in Organizational Culture and Mission 
In many cases, it may not be possible to effectively institutionalize CMAs -- especially 
CMAs directed toward promoting social justice -- without altering the underlying culture of 
organizations (Gross et. al., 1975; Jackson, 1986; Nadler, 1982; Packard, 1975). Similarly, 
changes in mission must be accompanied by corresponding changes in organizational reward 
structures so that concrete incentives are created to support the conflict management innovations. 
For example, an organizational culture that rewards individualistic, competitive, adversarial 
behavior will not long support or reward collaborative, non-adversarial CMAs. Likewise, an 
organization that has discrimination and other social inequities subtly embedded in its culture will 
not be able to support conflict management innovations designed to reverse discrimination and 
other affronts to social justice (Jackson, 1986). 
Jackson's research on multi-cultural organizations (1986) suggests that social justice 
oriented CMAs can be adopted more easily by organizations that are close to having achieved 
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multi-cultural status. The characteristics of multi-cultural organizations -- diverse cultural 
representation, equitable distribution of power and influence, support for the elimination of 
oppression, and support for multicultural perspectives in the larger society (Jackson, 1986) -- are 
very compatible with the norms of social justice oriented CMAs. However, Jackson's research 
and practice illustrates that an organization must build incentives for the elimination of oppression 
into the fundamental culture and mission of the organization through clear rewards and sanctions. 
Bidol's work provides another example of the importance of changing the organizational 
mission so that it is compatible with and supportive of the adoption of CMAs. Bidol spent a full 
year wcirking with employees throughout the entire SFWhD to write a new mission statement 
that would reflect their recent commitment to conflict management and environmental 
enhancement. This effort was clearly spelled out in the objectives of the reorganization plan as 
follows: 
Development of mission statement, goals, objectives, and action plans which reflect 
SFWMDYs desire to actively problem-solve (internally and externally) with key 
stakeholders to meet conflicts and challenges to water supply, flood control, environmental 
enhancement, and water quality protection (Bidol, 1984). 
VII. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Since institutionalization of CMAs inv~lves innov~tions in individual attitudes and skills, 
interpersonal relationships and organizations, the literature on innovation provides useful insights. 
Rogers' (19621 work suggests that the likelihood of successful institutionalization of CMAs is 
dependent in part upon the nature of the innovations. Rogers describes five key characteristics of 
innovations: (1) relative advantage, (2) compatability, (3) complexity, (4) divisibility, and (5) 
communicability. 
Relative Advantage 
Rogers defines relative advantage as  "...the degree to which an innovation is superior to 
ideas it supersedes. The degree of relative advantage is often expressed in economic profitability, 
but the relative advantage dimension may be measured in other ways" (p. 124-125). In addition 
to the advantage of reduced costs (McCarthy, 1984; NIDR, 19841, advocates of CMAs have cited 
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improved relationships (Bingham, 1986; Marks, et. al., 1984) and potentially improved social 
equity (Susskind and Ozawa, 1983). The above benefits suggest compelling advantages over 
traditional, adversarial methods of conflict management for many situations. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that institutionalizing CMAs may entail some 
added costs. Collaborative problem-solving can be very time consuming. Individuals and 
organizations may find it difficult to commit the necessary resources to support these consensus 
building processes. Since CMAs often involve the redistribution of power and authority, 
traditional power holders may associate CMAs with the loss of decision-making authority. 
Conversely, some fear that widespread use of CMAs may serve existing power holders by pre- 
empting adversarial forms of conflict that can lead to significant social change (Crowfoot, 1980). 
For example, heightened conflict in the wake of Earth Day led to the enactment of numerous 
powerful environmental protection statutes in the 1970's. Environmentalists critical of CMAs fear 
that collaborative dispute resolution processes will prevent meaningful social, economic and 
environmental changes, and instead lead to only marginal environmental improvements (Amy, 
1983a; Crowfoot, 1980). Labor leaders often raise similar concerns regarding departures from 
traditional modes of adversarial bargaining, and civil rights advocates warn against the erosion of 
principled rights in the face of out-of-court compromises (Edwards, 1986). 
Compatability 
Rogers defines compatability as  "...the degree to which an innovation is consistent with 
existing values and past experiences of the adopters" (p. 126-127). In many contexts, CMAs 
represent a new form of conflict management and problem-solving. As discussed previously, 
disputants may lack the necessary negotiation skills, and they may hold coercive or adversarial 
attitudes inimical to collaborative dispute resolution. Similarly, organizational cultures may 
reflect norms which are fundamentally inconsistent with the norms of CMAs. Where there is low 
compatability with existing practices and values, there is likely to be great resistance to change. 
Thus, significant relearning and resocialization may be necessary to overcome these barriers. 
I t  also is important to recognize that people manage conflicts in many different areas of 
their lives. Discussion of institutionalization of CMAs usually refers to one particular area of life, 
such a s  conflict management in the workplace. However, change in one area cannot be totally 
isolated from other areas of conflict management. Thus, while institutionalization of CMAs may 
be very compatible with existing practices for some areas of life, its overall compatibility still could 
be low due to the fact that people manage conflicts differently depending upon the context. 
Complexity 
Rogers defines complexity a s  "...the degree to which an innovation is relatively difficult to 
understand and use" (p. 130). Although face-to-face, non-adversarial problem-solving methods are 
not necessarily more difficult to understand than traditional forms of decision-making and conflict 
resolution, CMAs may be difficult to - use due to many of the reasons already identified. The 
potential necessity of building new relationships and changing organizational structures suggests 
that it may not be possible to simply graft CMAs on to traditional structures and processes. Thus, 
the institutionalization of CMAs may in fact represent a complex undertaking, and may require 
the assistance of professional organizational change agents and/or a detailed planning process. 
Divisibility 
Rogers defines divisibility a s  "...the degree to which an innovation may be tried on a 
limited basis" (p. 131). The experience to date in a variety of fields has shown that CMAs usually 
have been used on a trial basis or a s  an ad hoc tool (Bingham, 1986; Sullivan, 1984). Much of the 
impetus for the institutionalization of CMAs stems from the success of these trial, ad hoc efforts. 
Thus, divisibility of CMAs may be one of their key attributes in the early stages of 
institutionalization. 
Communicability 
Rogers defines communicability as "...the degree to which the results of an innovation may 
be diffused to others" (p. 132). He adds, "The results of some ideas are easily observed and 
communicated to others, while some innovations are difficult to describe to others" (p. 132). 
Evidence suggests that the communicability of CMAs is mixed. In some cases, the dramatic 
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successes achieved through the use of CMAs are clearly visible. For example, the successful 
mediation of the Storm King controversy that involved power plant siting on the Hudson River 
serves a s  a vivid success story in the emerging field of enirironmental mediation (Talbot, 1983). 
However, not all successful outcomes are easily communicated. Buckle and Thomas- 
Buckle (1986) researched eighty-one cases of en-.-ironmental mediation that failed to reach 
substantive agreements, but in which participants described the mediation effort as  a success. 
Participants cited several factors which they viewed a s  "successes" including increased ability to 
negotiate, insight into interests and positions, and better knowledge of options open to disputants. 
However, these process oriented outcomes frequently are  harder to describe and document than 
are substantive outcomes. 
Finally, it can be difficult to describe the uniqueness of ChIAs to people who are familiar 
only with traditional forms of bargaining and negotiation. For example, government off~cials often 
do not see the distinction between CMAs and what they normally do; they may feel that they 
routinely negotiate and resolve conflicis (Wondolleck: 1986). Many government officials view 
traditional public hearings as  equivalent to CMAs, and do not recognize that the controlled, one- 
way communication typical of public hearings is very different from the interactive dialggue and 
frequent power sharing associated with CM.4s. 
ITIII. CONSEQUENCES OF NSTITUTIONALIZATIOK 
Much of the early success attributed to CMAs has occurred in non-institutionalized, ad hoc 
dispute resolution forums. Thus, it is important to question whether institutionalization could lead 
to unintended negative ~onse~uences ' that  could impair dispute resolution eficacy and the quality 
of justice. In particular, it is important to look a t  the distinction between public and private 
/- 
disputes, and the potential advantages of informality and voluntarism. c, 
Common sense suggests that private disputes ought to be resolved however the disputants 
choose to resolve them, whereas public disputes ought to be resolved according to established, 
public~decision-making processes with the involvement of legitimate pubiic authorities. However, 
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a number of scholars have suggested that the line between public and private disputes is not clear. 
As Edwards (1986) emphasizes, "...many disputes cannot be easily classified as solely private 
disputes that implicate.no constitutional or public law" (p. 67 1). Supposedly private disputes often 
have fundamental issues of public rights and serious public policy implications embedded in them. 
On the surface, a dispute may appear to be a private matter; for example a community dispute 
that involves a specific group of people around a particular issue may seem to be limited in 
consequences to that unique set of disputants and circumstances. However, the accumulated 
impact of a number of similar disputes may in fact have serious public policy implications. 
For example, Edwards (1986) poses the question of what would have happened if many of 
the civil rights disputes in the United States had been settled through the use of CMAs as  
"private" community disputes in terms of non-legal, local community mores, rather than in court 
according to public civil rights laws. In other words, Edwards is suggesting that fundamental 
rights potentially can be bargained away in alternative dispute resolution forums. Similarly, the 
use of CMAs may prevent the establishment of important legal precedents which expand and 
guarantee fundamental rights. Thus, it is important that the institutionalization of CMAs not 
obstruct the establishment of legal precedents or compromise basic constitutional rights. As 
Edwards cautions, "...we must consider whether the disputes that will be resolved pursuant to an 
alternative dispute resolution system will involve significant public rights and duties" (p. 671). 
However, as the foregoing discussion suggests, this judgment is not always easy to make. 
Part of the success of CMAs may be because they have - not been institutionalized and 
constrained by law or formal organizational policy. In a world increasingly saddled with red tape, 
unformalized CMAs may offer vital flexibility and adaptability. Indeed, Edelman (1984) cautions 
that institutionalization of CMAs could lead to bureaucratization, which in turn could promote 
mass production and a focus on the quantity of cases handled or disputes settled rather than 
quality of the dispute resolution process or the justice of the settlement. 
The literature on CMAs usually stresses the importance of voluntarism where neither 
participation nor agreement are mandated. A potential consequence of institutionalization could be 
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a foreclosure of the voluntary nature of CMAs through subtle or overt requirements for 
participation and for reaching agreement. For example, a s  mentioned in Section IV, participation 
in CMAs can be mandated by law or organizational policy. However, coercive incentives also 
could be offered that serve to channel disputes into alternative processes, although participation 
literally is not required. Similarly, regardless of whether participation is mandated, there could be 
coercive incentives that push disputants toward agreement, even though technically they still may 
have a choice of dispute resolution methods and outcomes. Thus, it may be important to preserve 
the voluntary nature of CMAs even as they are institutionalized, in order to promote their just 
and efficacious use. 
As we strive to institutionalize CMAs as a means of improving dispute resolution and 
promoting social justice, we must be ready to critically assess the choices. However, we must, 
compare reality with reality: how do the strengths and weaknesses of CMAs compare with the 
strengths and weaknesses of traditional conflict management methods? Unfortunately, it is too 
easy to compare the reality of these emerging CMA experiments with idealized notions of how 
things should be, and judge CMAs unfairly. Undoubtedly, CMAs will not live up to idealized 
democratic principles and management formulas. The success or failure of CMAs must be judged 
against the real costs of non-agreements (Fisher and Ury, 1981), poor processes and unjust 
outcomes. 
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